Constitutional Law - Right of Privacy - Sodomy Statutes - Supreme Court Summary Affirmance by Cooney, Leslie Larkin
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 15 Number 1 Article 8 
1976 
Constitutional Law - Right of Privacy - Sodomy Statutes - Supreme 
Court Summary Affirmance 
Leslie Larkin Cooney 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leslie L. Cooney, Constitutional Law - Right of Privacy - Sodomy Statutes - Supreme Court Summary 
Affirmance, 15 Duq. L. Rev. 123 (1976). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol15/iss1/8 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-SODOMY STAT-
UTES-SUPREME COURT SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE-The United States
Supreme Court has affirmed without opinion the decision of a three-
judge district court validating a state's right to criminalize sexual
acts between consenting homosexuals carried out in the privacy of
the home.
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va.
1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
Two anonymous plaintiffs, John Doe and Richard Roe, filed an
individual and class action' against the Attorney for the Common-
wealth for the City of Richmond challenging the constitutionality
of a Virginia statute which criminalized prescribed sexual behavior.2
Active homosexuals, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief from enforcement of the statute which makes no distinc-
tion between public and private sodomitic acts and clearly pro-
scribes certain adult consensual conduct performed in the seclusion
of one's bedroom. The plaintiffs alleged the statute deprived them
of their right of privacy.3 Having neither been arrested nor threat-
ened with arrest for the commission of homosexual acts, plaintiffs
apparently based their complaint on the statute's "chilling" effect
on their enjoyment of acts they believed were constitutionally pro-
1. Upon oral argument, the plaintiffs abandoned their prayer for class relief. The district
court ruled the case did not fit within the compass of FED. R. Civ. P. 23 and found class relief
unnecessary. Doe v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
2. The Virginia sodomy statute, as amended, now reads in part:
Crimes Against Nature.-If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute
animal, or carnally know any male or female person by the anus or by or with the
mouth, or voluntarily submit to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a
. . . felony.
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-361 (1975).
3. The plaintiffs also contended the threat of prosecution denied them fourteenth amend-
ment due process and equal protection, first amendment free expression and association,
violated the establishment clause of the first amendment, and constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the eighth amendment. Brief for Plaintiff at 10-21, Doe v.
Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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tected.4 A divided three-judge district court5 upheld the Virginia
statute. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the decision.'
THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION
The majority bottomed its analysis of the constitutional claim on
a restrictive reading of Supreme Court decisions recognizing the
right of privacy, and limited their scope to the incidents of marriage,
the sanctity of the home and the protection of family life.7 The court
cited Griswold v. Connecticut' as the basis for the plaintiffs' chal-
lenge of the statute, and distinguished Griswold as guaranteeing a
right of privacy only to married couples.' Relying heavily on Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,'0 the court held that homosexual
intimacy can be criminalized by a state even when privately prac-
4. There has been a lack of litigation on the issue of private adult consensual sexual
behavior due to the problem of standing. If an act is truly private, prosecution would be rare
or nonexistent. Force accompanying the conduct or public exposure of any kind invalidates
a claim that the action is protected by the right of privacy. See Note, On Privacy: Constitu-
tional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 670, 721 & nn.311 & 312 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as On Privacyl.
5. A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970), which
requires such a forum when an injunction against the enforcement of a state statute is at
issue. Section 2281 has been repealed and reenacted as § 2284. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119.
6. 96 S. Ct. 1489 (1976). Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens noted probable argu-
ment but the "rule of four" applied: plenary consideration with oral argument requires the
vote of four judges. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 246-47 (1959). See also Note,
Sum mary Disposition of Supreme Court Appeals: The Significance of Limited Discretion and
a Theory of Limited Precedent, 52 B.U.L. REv. 373, 396-97 (1972).
7. 403 F. Supp. at 1200. The right of privacy is not expressly found in the Constitution,
but the Supreme Court has recognized certain zones in which privacy is protected. In varying
contexts, the Court has posited the roots of this right in the first, fourth and fifth amend-
ments, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, in the ninth amendment and in the concept
of liberty found in the first section of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (summarizing the opinion and concurrences in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut).
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives
to husband and wife declared unconstitutional).
9. 403 F. Supp. at 1200-01.
10. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). In Ullman, a challenge to a Connecticut statute by two married
women who desired medical advice on contraception was dismissed for lack of standing.
Justice Harlan dissented and found the statute unconstitutional because it also forbade the
use of contraceptives. He felt the right of privacy was not absolute, however, and took the
view that tradition alone may be sufficient reason not to extend constitutional protection to
certain areas. Id. at 546-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Doe majority noted that Harlan's dissent had been adopted in Griswold. 403 F. Supp.
at 1201. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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ticed since under its police power the state has a right to be con-
cerned with its inhabitants' moral welfare." Eschewing a definitive
statement concerning a state's burden to demonstrate a legitimate
interest in the subject of the statute, the court held that if the state
had such a burden it was met since the statute was directed toward
the suppression of crime. In its view, no causal connection between
the sexual activity and moral delinquency was required; it was suffi-
cient that sodomitic conduct was likely to contribute to moral delin-
quency.'2 The court reasoned that the longevity of the Virginia stat-
ute and its Judeo-Christian ancestry buttressed the state's claim of
a legitimate governmental interest.'3
The majority's focus on the state's interest in morality and de-
cency rather than the individual's interest in the intimacy of his sex
life prompted the dissenting judge to argue that the majority misin-
terpreted the issue, the constitutional right of privacy.' 4 Rather than
limiting the right to the areas of marital, home, and family life,
Judge Merhige concluded Supreme Court precedents dealing with
the right of privacy gave every person a right to make private, inti-
mate decisions without unwarranted governmental intrusions.' 5 He
criticized the majority's reliance on Ullman, and noted Justice Har-
lan's argument that the state could constitutionally forbid extra-
marital sexuality had been blunted by Eisenstadt v. Baird,'" where
the Supreme Court declined to restrict the right of privacy to the
marital entity. In contrast with the majority, Merhige determined
that the fourteenth amendment'" required the state to prove a com-
11. 403 F. Supp. at 1201-02.
12. Id. at 1202. As an illustration, the court looked at the factual situation of Lovisi v.
Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973). In Lovisi, a married couple who participated in
fellatio with a male third party could not assert the right of privacy since their minor daugh-
ters had carried photographs of the act to school.
13. 403 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
14. Id. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 1203, citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Texas statute invalidated since
abortion was within protected right of privacy until point in pregnancy where the state's
interest in mother and fetus became "compelling"); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)
(companion case to Roe which struck down procedural directives in Georgia abortion law
since compelling interests were not shown by the state); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
16. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (Massachusetts contraception statute allowing distribution to
married but not single persons held unconstitutional).
17. Judge Merhige found a basis for attaching the right of privacy to homosexual conduct
in the fourteenth amendment's liberty guarantee. He distinguished cases where conduct was
forcible, nonprivate, or involved minors. 403 F. Supp. at 1204-05, citing Smayda v. United
1976
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pelling interest before regulating private intimate sexual behavior."
The dissenter also would have invalidated the statute based on its
intrusion into the home, an area extended special safeguards in
Stanley v. Georgia.'9
THE SUPREME COURT'S SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE
The Supreme Court chose to summarily affirm rather than fully
examine the district court opinion and by so doing created a number
of uncertainties, both as to the precedential value of Doe for future
cases dealing with the right of privacy and the effect of Doe on past
decisions delineating this right. A summary affirmance, one type of
summary disposition, is the Supreme Court's method of affirming
without opinion a district court appeal within its obligatory jurisdic-
tion 21 when the Court feels the decision does not warrant plenary
consideration.2 ' In affirming without opinion, the Supreme Court
summarily affirms cases on appeal from federal district court, and
dismisses for lack of a substantial federal question appeals from
state court decisions.22
The impact of Doe as Supreme Court precedent to be relied upon
by future courts confronted with delimiting the scope of the privacy
right is unclear; the Supreme Court has never specifically defined
the precedential value of a summary affirmance. Summary disposi-
tions have been recognized by the Court as decisions "on the mer-
its ' ' 23 which cannot be freely ignored. In Hicks v. Miranda,24 the
States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965) (oral copulation in men's restroom); Lovisi v. Slayton,
363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973) (photographs taken of illicit act); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F.
Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969) (forcible sodomy with wife); Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497,
287 A.2d 299 (1972) (sodomy with male under eighteen).
18. 403 F. Supp. at 1205. In Judge Merhige's view the Commonwealth had not even
established a rational basis for proscribing these acts.
19. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possession of obscene material within one's home constitutionally
protected).
20. Appeals from three-judge district courts are directly to the United States Supreme
Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
21. See generally Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 96 S. Ct. 3228 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the weight of summary dispositions).
22. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME CouRT PRAcriCE 233 (4th ed. 1969). See also
Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the Supreme Court for Want of a
Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v. Miranda, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
508, 508 n.l (1976).
23. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959) (Brennan, J.) (explain-
ing Court procedure in granting plenary consideration of appeals).
24. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). In Hicks, a three-judge district court declared the California
Vol. 15: 123
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Supreme Court held that a district court was not free to disregard
the summary disposition of a previous case; until informed other-
wise such a decision was to be recognized as fully binding prece-
dent. 25 The summary disposition referred to in Hicks was a dis-
missal for want of a substantial federal question. The "Hicks
rule, 12 however, would seem to apply to the Doe summary affirm-
ance since any basis for distinguishing between a dismissal for want
of a substantial federal question and a summary affirmance is
purely historical .2 There were indications from the Court prior to
Hicks that summary affirmances were not of the same precedential
value as written opinions decided after plenary consideration.28 But
in a dissent to a denial of certiorari in Colorado Springs Amuse-
ments, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 2 1 Justice Brennan observed that the pron-
ouncements on dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question
articulated in Hicks do apply to summary affirmances; 3° he criti-
cized the "Hicks rule" for impairing adjudication of significant con-
stitutional issues.3 1
Notwithstanding its effect upon future decisions concerning the
right of privacy, the impact of Doe's summary affirmance on exist-
ing precedent such as Eisenstadt and Stanley is important. Chief
Justice Burger, concurring in Fusari v. Steinberg,3 2 expressed the
view that a summary affirmance supports the judgment but not
necessarily the reasoning of the lower court and is not to be read as
obscenity statute unconstitutional, disregarding the Supreme Court's summary dismissal in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which concerned the same statute. Reviewing the
Hicks decision, the Court held that although a district court could not reconsider the constitu-
tional issue in Miller, it could consider the constitutionality of separate issues not discussed
therein.
25. 422 U.S. at 343-45.
26. Justice Brennan has referred to the principle that a summary disposition is fully
binding precedent as the "Hicks rule." Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 96 S.
Ct. 3228, 3229 n.2 (1976).
27. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
28. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (summary affirmances not of the
same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the
merits); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576 (1973) (acknowledgment that summary dispo-
sitions are "somewhat opaque").
29. 96 S. Ct. 3228 (1976).
30. Id. at 3229 n.1.
31. Id. at 3231. Justice Brennan specifically cited the summary affirmance of Doe as
puzzling to lower court judges. Id. at 3232.
32. 419 U.S. 379 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (due process challenge to termination
of unemployment benefits must be considered in light of current state law).
1976
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a renunciation of principles previously announced by the Supreme
Court.3 In view of this admonition and the possible application of
the "Hicks rule" to the Doe summary affirmance, the extent to
which Doe portends further restrictions upon the right of privacy is
uncertain.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The questions raised by the summary affirmance of the district
court's opinion require a closer examination of the reasoning and
rationale of Doe which seem to limit the right of personal privacy
to the specific areas of marital and family life.34 Griswold spawned
the zone of privacy concept but did not fully outline its parameters.
The plaintiffs in Doe sought an extension of the right of privacy to
consensual, nonpublic, sexual conduct between adults. A broad
reading of Griswold would grant the individual a right to make
certain decisions involving intimate and personal matters. By limit-
ing Griswold to its factual situation and refusing to grant relief to
these plaintiffs, the Doe court left the state free to dictate what is
moral and decent without considering the possible ramifications on
personal privacy.
This rejection of the broader implications of Griswold is especially
troublesome in light of Eisenstadt v. Baird.35 Decided several years
after Griswold, Eisenstadt held a Massachusetts contraceptive stat-
ute which permitted dissimilar treatment of married and unmarried
persons violative of the equal protection clause." The Court indi-
cated that protection afforded the right of privacy in sexual matters
should no longer be limited to the marital state. 7 Although
33. The Chief Justice stated:
When we summarily affirm, without an opinion . . . we affirm the judgment but not
necessarily the reasoning by which it was reached. An unexplicated summary affirm-
ance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this
Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.
Id. at 391.
34. 403 F. Supp. at 1200. Acts previously recognized as protected include abortion, Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); use of contraceptives by unmarried persons, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); viewing obscene material within the home, Stanely v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969); interracial marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); and use of
contraceptives by married persons, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
35. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
36. Id. at 446-55.
37. The Court stated:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and
Vol. 15: 123
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Eisenstadt is factually distinguishable from Doe in that it did not
involve homosexual conduct, the Doe court's failure to refer to
Eisenstadt is disturbing. The Virginia statute does not criminalize
homosexuality. It speaks instead of carnal acts in which members
of opposite sexes, including married couples, could engage.38 Doe
and its summary affirmance may significantly limit the scope of
Eisenstadt and confine its protection to the purchase of contracep-
tives, rather than the actual sexual intimacy of the individuals.3 1
The Supreme Court has consistently held that when a state in-
vades a fundamental right it has the burden of proving that such
an invasion serves a compelling state interest.40 Despite Supreme
Court reluctance to extend the boundaries of fundamental rights in
other contexts," the recognition of private, adult, consensual sexual
behavior as fundamental would not require a major doctrinal
change;4" it was generally assumed the right of privacy would reach
such behavior.4 3 Although the majority of courts have reached re-
sults similar to Doe,44 recent decisions in two state courts have inval-
heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.
405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
38. See note 2 supra for the text of the statute.
39. The Supreme Court has never decided whether the marriage entity insulates individu-
als from prosecutions for sodomitic acts. There is no language in the Virginia statute which
would prevent its application to sexual acts of married individuals. The potential breadth of
the Virginia statute crystallizes the problem attending a summary affirmance, particularly
since the district court did not clarify whether it was upholding the statute only as applied
or whether the statute enabled the Commonwealth to criminalize any sexual conduct it
deemed deleterious to the moral fabric of its citizenry.
40. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447
n.7 (1972). Cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) (indicating one's right of personal
appearance is not fundamental and can be regulated where a rational basis is shown); Reed
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (classification based on sex must rest on "fair and substantial
relation" between the regulation and the state's goals).
41. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (decent housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485 (1970) (welfare payments).
42. See Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual Conduct, 72
MICH. L. REV. 1613, 1637 (1974).
43. Id. See also On Privacy, supra note 4, at 720 & n.309.
44. See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 256 Ind. 266, 268 N.E.2d 84 (1971) (sodomy statute upheld);
Hughes v. State, 14 Md. App. 497, 287 A.2d 299 (1972) (statute forbidding unnatural sex acts
constitutional); Canfield v. State, 506 P.2d 987 (Okla. Crim. App.), dismissed for want of
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 15: 123
idated sodomy statutes as an invasion of privacy. In State v.
Callaway,45 the court reasoned that Eisenstadt gave the privacy
right of sexual intimacy to all people whether married or not." In
State v. Elliott,47 the court relied on Griswold and Roe v. Wade,4"
which granted constitutional protection to those seeking abortions,
and extended their rationale beyond the right of marital privacy to
protect unmarried individuals.49 Arguably, the right to sexual inti-
macy is basic to the individual and a necessary prerequisite to effec-
tive enjoyment of other fundamental rights; therefore this right is
fundamental in itself.50
In view of the Supreme Court's reluctance to increase the number
of fundamental rights,5 the result in Doe may be understandable,
but the reasoning of the court from the standpoint of constitutional
adjudication is troublesome. The court dismissed the constitutional
challenge by pointing to the longevity of the statute, the existence
of similar statutes in other states and the law's theological
underpinnings52-- three elements arguably irrelevant in assessing
whether the statute conflicts with constitutional limitations on gov-
ernmental power. Without addressing the close question of whether
a fundamental right was involved, the Doe court intimated the state
need not demonstrate a "legitimate interest" to justify the statute.53
federal question, 414 U.S. 991 (1973) (statute proscribing "detestable and abominable crime
against nature" upheld); Pruett v. State, 463 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970), dismissed
for want of federal question, 402 U.S.' 902 (1971) (sodomy conviction of minors in reform
school upheld after a refusal to follow district court's nullification of statute).
45. 25 Ariz. App. 267, 542 P.2d 1147 (1975) (right of sexual privacy deemed fundamental).
46. Id.
47. 539 P.2d 207 (N.M. 1975) (sodomy statute held unconstitutional since it violates right
of personal privacy and right to privacy in the home).
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. 539 P.2d at 213.
50. See State v. Callaway, 25 Ariz. App. 267, 272, 542 P.2d 1147, 1151 (1975). In Callaway
the sodomy statute was successfully challenged based on the right of privacy even though the
defendant had been convicted of forcible sodomy. But see note 17 supra.
51. See cases cited note 41 supra.
52. 403 F. Supp. at 1202-03. The use of a Biblical quotation and Judeo-Christian law
arguably should have enhanced plaintiffs' argument that the sodomy statute violated the first
amendment establishment clause. See Jurisdictional Statement for Appellants at 9 n.4, Doe
v. Commonwealth's Att'y, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff 'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional Statement].
53. The Doe opinion did not recognize the privacy of the plaintiffs as fundamental. The
court concluded that if Virginia had the burden of proving a legitimate interest in the subject
of the statute, the Commonwealth had done so. 403 F. Supp. at 1202. Where neither a
fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved, a state generally need only show a
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The court seemed to decide that no fundamental right was involved
but failed to articulate that position. It ignored not only Eisenstadt,
but also Stanley v. Georgia,4 which recognized a right to be free
from unwanted intrusions into the home except in very limited cir-
cumstances.55 Despite its previous observation that regulations
which invaded the home could be overturned," the court ignored
Stanley. In its view, if the state desires to promote morality and
decency by criminalizing conduct, even in the home, it is not for the
court to forbid the state from doing so."
CONCLUSION
Justice Brandeis once called the right to be let alone the most
comprehensive and valued right of civilized man.5" Whereas
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Stanley gave constitutional substance to
rational basis for legislation. A showing of a legitimate interest will usually satisfy a rational
basis standard. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911) (New York
statute regulating natural mineral springs held constitutional).
It is not entirely clear that the state could meet a rational basis standard. No evidence was
introduced as to the harm of homosexual conduct upon society. 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Mer-
hige, J., dissenting). The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code takes the position there
is no legitimate goal in criminalizing private homosexual behavior. MODEL PENAL CODE §
207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The Pennsylvania Joint Council on the Criminal
Justice System recently reported:
On sexual acts between consenting adults in private, since no legitimate governmental
purpose is served by invading the privacy of adult individuals' sexual behavior, the
General Assembly is urged to immediately enact legislation to repeal all state laws
regulating private sexual behavior and prevent units of local government from enacting
any such regulation.
PENNSYLVANIA STANDARDS FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 159 (1976).
54. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (state conviction for possessing obscene material overturned,
distinguishing between commercial distribution of obscene matter and the private enjoyment
of similar material in one's own home).
55. The Doe plaintiffs contended the sodomy statute was void in that it invaded the
privacy of the home. Jurisdictional Statement, supra note 52, at 7. According to Stanley,
where acts are confined to the home, the government must at least establish a close and
substantial relationship between statutory restrictions and a legitimate governmental goal.
394 U.S. at 564. The Supreme Court has limited Stanley and has not given an absolute right
to engage in conduct which adversely affects the individual or other persons. See, e.g., United
States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (obscene material entering stream of commerce through
mode of private transportation not within the protection of the home); Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (movie theatre not extended the protection granted to the home
by Stanley).
56. 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
57. Id. at 1202.
58. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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that view, the breadth of this right has been left uncertain by the
Court's summary affirmance of Doe. Twice since Doe the Supreme
Court has addressed the scope of the right of privacy. While Paul
v. Davis" indicated the Court will limit the right of personal privacy
to the factual situations of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe,'" the
Court in Runyon v. McCrary" reaffirmed its recognition of the home
as a place where governmental intrusion is ordinarily undesirable.2
Until the Supreme Court clarifies its views in this sensitive area by
something other than a summary affirmance of a divided three-
judge court, Virginia and other states with similar statutes can con-
tinue to criminalize intimate sexual activity between consenting
adults, conduct previously thought to be beyond the reach of gov-
ernmental regulation.
Leslie Larkin Cooney
59. 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (reputation not protected by the fourteenth amendment).
60. In a 5-4 decision, Justice Rehnquist held that reputation alone is not a "liberty" or
"property" interest sufficient to invoke the strictures of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Relying on Roe, the Court held that privacy rights are those which are
"fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." The Court found the respon-
dent's claim of privacy in matters of reputation "far afield" of areas such as marriage,
procreation, contraception, child rearing and education, and family relationships, where the
state's power to regulate conduct has been limited. Id. at 713.
61. 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976) (racial discrimination prohibited in private schools).
62. Id. at 2598.
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